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CHAPTER
Accumulated trade costs and their impact on 
domestic and international value chains
HUBERT ESCAITH
According to trade analysts, trade costs — together with the relative size of the exporting and import-ing economies — are among the main determinants of bilateral trade patterns. More important from a 
trade and development perspective, trade costs influence the 
competitiveness of domestic firms on the international market 
and the success of policies to join and move up global value 
chains (GVCs). Although trade costs have declined over the past 
decades, their relevance has increased with the surge of frag-
mented supply chains and the greater competition in a “small 
world” in which everybody cooperates and competes with 
everybody.
The reduction in transportation costs, the progressive decline 
in tariff duties and other customs barriers, and the progress in 
information and communication technology connectivity have 
“flattened the planet” by reducing transaction costs, which has 
in turn contributed to the rapid expansion of global trade since 
1985. After reviewing the domestic value added embodied in 
the final expenditure of markets of ultimate destination over 
time, Johnson (2014) and Johnson and Noguera (2016) identified 
five stylized facts that explain the lessening of trade frictions.1 
But as Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) noted, “The death of 
distance is exaggerated. Trade costs are large, even aside from 
trade policy barriers and even between apparently highly inte-
grated economies.”
The decline in trade frictions stalled after the 2008–09 global 
financial crisis (Escaith and Miroudot 2015), and the new empha-
ses are on reducing transaction costs and facilitating trade. In 
the geographically fragmented production networks that have 
emerged since the mid-1990s, trade in intermediate goods 
accounts for more than half the volume of international transac-
tions. More than in traditional bilateral trade in final goods, trans-
action costs (border and behind-the-border costs of trade) are 
crucial elements of the competitiveness of firms and partly deter-
mine their ability to participate in global production networks. 
These trade frictions are mainly an exogenous cost factor for the 
operators of international supply chains, who may mitigate the 
negative impacts through leaner production management but 
cannot alter the underlying causes. Facilitating trade remains 
largely the domain of public action.
Trade costs such as applied tariffs, transportation and insur-
ance costs, and other border taxes and fees are amplified as they 
pass through the steps associated with modern supply chains. 
This so-called cascade effect arises because trade costs accumu-
late as intermediate goods are imported and then re-exported 
farther downstream, going through different processing nodes 
before reaching the final consumer. Thus, trade costs reduce the 
gains from trade that countries expect from participating in GVCs.
From the exporting firm perspective the financial impact of 
trade costs is magnified in the “trade in tasks” rationale that 
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governs GVCs. In contrast to a large integrated firm concentrat-
ing most production processes under the same roof, specialized 
processing firms that spread their manufacturing over multi-
ple locations need to recoup the associated trade cost, which 
applies to the full value of the good, from the smaller fraction of 
value added at each productive stage. This larger relative weight 
of transaction expenses on the profitability of individual busi-
ness operations explains why trade along GVCs is particularly 
exposed to trade costs.
This chapter measures international trade costs from the 
value chain perspective and reviews their implications at the 
industry, national, and global levels. Trade frictions increase the 
production cost 18% in a single stage of the value chain. Most of 
the additional expenses result from deficient logistic and trade 
facilitation conditions, many of which fall under the control of 
domestic policymakers. Trade costs are not only damaging for 
domestic firms willing to join GVCs, they also affect all trade 
partners and generate systemic losses. Using network analysis 
that goes beyond the traditional bilateral dimension of interna-
tional trade, this chapter identifies where investment in trade 
facilitation would have the highest social returns from a multi-
lateral perspective.
Tariffs, cascading transaction costs, and 
competitiveness
Distance, transportation costs, and tariffs are only some of the fac-
tors that affect trade costs; there are many others, some of them 
not directly measurable, such as uncertainty (see Anderson and 
van Wincoop 2004 or Ferrantino 2012 for a review of trade costs 
and border barriers and their measurement). One way of under-
standing these factors is to associate them with the set of frictions 
that tend to reduce trade. Samuelson (1954) depicts trade shrink-
ing under the effect of frictions in the same way that an iceberg 
melts while moving through the sea. International economics has 
overwhelmingly relied on Samuelson’s hypothesis that frictions are 
proportional to value (ad valorem “iceberg transport cost”).
An extensive literature has explored the influence of trade 
costs, especially using the gravity model. Head and Mayer (2013) 
showed that the magnitude of estimated elasticity of gross trade 
in goods varies across studies depending on the sample and 
methodology used but centers around –1. Baldwin and Taglioni 
(2011) showed that for GVC trade the standard gravity model 
used by most studies performs poorly when applied to bilateral 
flows where parts and components trade is important.2 Noguera 
(2012) applied a gravity model to trade in value added and found 
that the bilateral trade cost elasticity of value-added exports was 
about two-thirds that of gross exports and that bilateral value-
added exports increased with both bilateral trade agreements 
(a result also found in trade in final goods) and agreements with 
other countries.
Nominal tariffs are the most visible cross-border transaction 
cost. Tariff duties increase the domestic price of tradable goods 
by adding a tax to their international or free market price. When 
duties are specific (particularly for agricultural products), analysts 
compute ad valorem equivalents. This chapter shows that tariffs 
are not the biggest trade costs despite being the most visible, as 
for the iceberg.
For transportation costs the situation is more complex. In prac-
tice, transportation costs depend on the nature of the good (per-
ishable or not, bulky or not), the mode of transport, and the dis-
tance between producers and consumers. Lewis (1994) identified 
several factors besides freight costs that contribute to logistics 
costs, including interest charges on goods awaiting shipment, on 
goods in transit, and on goods held as safety stock, as well as the 
loss, damage, or decay of goods between manufacture and sale.
Because tariffs have become a less frequent barrier to trade, 
the contribution of transportation to total trade costs — shipping 
plus insurance — has become more evident and more important. 
Hummels (2007) found that median transport expenditures were 
half as much as tariff duties for U.S. imports in 1958, equal to 
tariff duties in 1965 and three times higher than aggregate tariff 
duties in 2004.
Time matters, especially in GVC trade organized along com-
plex international supply chains. See, for example, Hayakawa, 
Laksanapanyakul, and Yoshimi (2016), who concentrated on 
the time spent in the import process, including cargo handling 
and customs clearance. Those are the key components of the 
ad valorem time-related trade costs that are shifted onto the 
import price of imported inputs. If those costs are passed on to 
the price of exports, the demand for these exported products 
becomes smaller as time gaps lengthen.
Trade cost magnification and accumulation through 
global value chains
When manufacturing is geographically segmented and orga-
nized as an international production network, trade costs at each 
step of the production process are incorporated into production 
costs and passed on to the next step through a higher free-on-
board value of the processed good. The trade costs propagate 
through the supply chain, cascading from upstream to down-
stream to the final consumers.
The impact of cascading transaction costs is amplified as 
intermediate goods are further processed by importing countries 
and then re-exported. If tariff accumulation is ultimately paid by 
the final consumer,3 tariff magnification relates to the processing 
firms’ financial returns (gross profits). GVC suppliers are mainly 
price takers, and high trade costs translate into reduced value 
added. For the processing firm at each step of the supply chain, 
the additional costs have to be compensated for out of the value 
added generated by the fees the firm receives for processing the 
imported inputs and re-exporting them to another GVC partici-
pant. Unlike a fully integrated firm, which builds a product from 
stage A to Z and cashes in the full commercial value of the gross 
output, the processing firm can count on only the smaller share 
of value added it creates (its processing fees).
It is thus important to measure the impact of trade costs not 
in proportion to the total value of the output (unlike the “ice-
berg” metaphor in conventional trade analysis) but in proportion 
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to the value added generated at each step of the supply chain. 
The latter value is often much smaller than the full commercial 
value of the intermediate good to which trade costs apply, so the 
financial impact of trade costs on the processing firm’s competi-
tiveness and profitability in a GVC context is said to be amplified.
To see how amplification affects the bottom line of an export-
ing firm, take an export processing firm that uses imported inputs 
that cost a hypothetical value of 40 (excluding trade costs) to pro-
duce a final good that sells on the international market for 100 
(table 4.1). The value added of 60 generated at international prices 
is split between employee remuneration (40) and gross profit 
(20). If the processing firm is a price taker and the cost of labor is 
exogenously fixed, any increase in trade costs (10 in the example) 
will reduce gross profit. The impact of trade costs on the input 
procurement cost is magnified on what truly matters for the firm: 
the share of value added that remains as gross profit, once other 
production costs have been paid. In this example, an added trade 
cost of 25% leads to a reduction of 50% in gross profit.
Obviously, this is a simple example, and the firm’s profitability 
depends on many other factors, including returns to scale. The 
firm should thus decide whether the higher volume of sales that 
may be expected from joining a GVC compensates for the lower 
profit margin per unit of output. While the exporting decision 
depends on factors beyond the scope of this chapter, higher 
trade costs lower the probability of exporting compared with 
selling on the domestic market.
Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2014) illustrated the accumulation 
and amplification effects of tariffs based on actual data (table 
4.2). Column 1 reports the standard tariff on a country’s exports 
(the trade-weighted tariff rate applied by a country’s trading 
partners in ad valorem equivalent). Column 2 reports the share 
of imported content in final goods exports. These imported 
intermediate inputs are used to produce exports of final goods 
and thus incur multiple tariff charges. Column 3 reports the tariff 
rate on imported inputs as a share of free-on-board export value 
(trade-weighted average tariffs for intermediate inputs from the 
other countries and regions that are used in the exporting coun-
try to produce final good exports). The sum of the two tariffs is 
in column 4.
Column 5 provides the first-order accumulation effect of 
using imported intermediate inputs to produce exports. It rep-
resents the accumulation cost-push effect of the length of the 
supply chain increasing by a single processing step if tariffs were 
the only factor that augmented the trading costs. For instance, 
one additional stage of production increases the trade costs of 
Viet Nam’s merchandise production by 80% of its standard tariff. 
Column 6 reports the gross effective tariff rate on output, which 
equals the standard tariff rate in column 2 divided by the domes-
tic content share (which is 1 minus column 2) and weighted by 
trade.4 Column 7 reports the implied magnification ratio due to 
the presence of vertical specialization. These effects are gener-
ally larger than the tariff accumulation factor in column 5.
The magnification effect worsens the impact of trade costs 
for low-income developing economies, because the share of 
domestic value added is usually lower in their manufactured 
exports than those of developed countries, and their trade costs 
are higher. Considering that value added is used mainly for the 
remuneration of employees and invested capital, higher-than- 
average trade costs result in lower salaries and reduced invest-
ment in order to maintain competitiveness at world market 
prices. So reducing tariffs and nontariff trade costs globally 
through multilateral agreement is fully consistent with the inter-
ests of developing economies because it lowers the cost of their 
GVC participation and improves their potential for upgrading.
For domestic firms, lowering their trade costs on the import 
of intermediate inputs for domestic manufacturing production 
would greatly reduce the magnification effects, as demonstrated 
in column 5. Lowering such costs in other countries would greatly 
reduce the effective tariff rate in their export markets, as seen 
in columns 6 and 7, because of the lower domestic value-added 
share in most developing countries’ manufacturing exports.
Even if trade costs have decreased over the past decades as 
a result of technological progress and trade policies, their influ-
ence through cost accumulation and magnification is expected 
to become stronger as participation in GVCs increases, espe-
cially in manufacturing industries. As discussed in chapter 2, the 
average length of total production shows a clear upward trend 
at the world level, especially after 2002. The relative importance 
of pure domestic production activities is diminishing, though the 
trend was temporarily interrupted by the global financial crisis, 
when the value added embodied in complex and simple GVC 
production-sharing activities had increased rapidly, until 2011. 
Further, the average production length of complex multistage 
production-sharing arrangements increased by 0.36 between 
2002 and 2011, much faster than the lengthening of production 
in simple production sharing and pure domestic production. 
Moreover, trade frictions remain substantial and are exposed to 
the return of protectionist sentiments. Using more recent 2011–
14 World Input- Output Database data, Timmer and others (2016) 
TABLE 4.1 Amplification effect of trade costs on value 
added and profit margin
Profit and costs
Processing for export
No trade 
costs
With trade 
costs
Imported intermediate input 
(free on board) 40 40
Trade cost on inputs 0 10
Value added 60 50
Labor 40 40
Profit 20 10
Export price (free on board) 100 100
Source: Adapted from Diakantoni and others 2017.
Note: Simple example based on hypothetical values, for illustrative purposes 
only.
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found that international fragmentation of production proba-
bly stalled in recent years, a slowdown that is reviewed in more 
detail in chapter 2.
Transaction costs and domestic value added
This section focuses on the implication of trade costs for the pro-
duction function of industries, their operational costs, and ulti-
mately their gross margins. In a GVC environment where firms 
trade in tasks or in such business functions as research and devel-
opment, logistics, and manufacturing services, trade costs affect 
profitability and competitiveness. Trade in tasks is often called 
trade in value added, because what firms exchange in their busi-
ness-to-business transactions along GVCs are not products but 
value added. Monetary trade costs (tariffs, transportation, and 
other financial costs identified by Lewis [1994]) increase the price 
of the value added on the domestic market, creating an anti-ex-
port bias in a trade in tasks perspective.
An intuitive way of understanding this effect is to extend 
table 4.1 to a case where a domestic firm chooses between sell-
ing on the domestic market (at a price that includes the effect 
of nominal protection) and exporting at the world price. While 
trade frictions lower the gross profits when the firm exports its 
product, the same trade costs have the effect of increasing the 
profit margin when the product is sold (at a higher price) on the 
domestic market (table 4.3).
The intuition behind the calculation of the net effect on 
value added to the domestic price (called the effective rate of 
protection) is as follows. The theoretical referent is a neoclassic 
economy where countries have access to the same technologies 
and will choose the combination that best fits their resource 
endowments. In a frictionless trade environment the world price 
of a given product is unique. If the price charged by domestic 
producers is higher than the world price, consumers will shift 
to imported products. Similarly, if the domestic price is lower, 
TABLE 4.2 Magnification effect on tariff costs under global value chain trade, 2004
Country/region
(1) 
Standard 
tariff 
(%)
(2) 
Share of 
imported 
content in 
final goods 
exports 
(%)
(3) 
Tariff on 
imported 
inputs 
(% of free-on-
board export 
value)
(4) 
Two-stage 
tariffs (1+3) 
(%)
(5) 
Accumulation 
effect 
(4 ÷ 1)
(6) 
Gross 
effective 
tariff rate 
in export 
market 
(%)
(7) 
Magnification 
ratio
(6 ÷ 1)
Advanced economies
Australia–New Zealand 15.55 0.13 0.34 15.89 1.02 27.00 1.74
Canada 1.60 0.38 0.24 1.84 1.15 7.05 4.41
Western European Union 6.16 0.12 0.24 6.40 1.04 12.09 1.96
Japan 6.22 0.12 0.05 6.27 1.01 11.19 1.80
United States 4.38 0.13 0.17 4.55 1.04 9.19 2.10
Emerging Asia
China 6.17 0.29 1.91 8.08 1.31 21.42 3.47
Indonesia 7.53 0.30 1.34 8.87 1.18 24.39 3.24
Malaysia 3.55 0.46 2.11 5.66 1.59 20.93 5.90
Philippines 5.57 0.39 1.07 6.64 1.19 22.47 4.03
Thailand 8.16 0.40 4.23 12.39 1.52 36.54 4.48
Viet Nam 10.71 0.43 8.62 19.33 1.80 55.10 5.14
India 7.82 0.18 2.98 10.80 1.38 22.08 2.82
Other emerging economies
Brazil 12.27 0.13 1.22 13.49 1.10 22.77 1.86
EU accession 2.41 0.34 0.55 2.96 1.23 12.67 5.26
Mexico 0.88 0.31 1.00 1.88 2.14 6.36 7.23
Russian Federation 5.36 0.18 1.61 6.97 1.30 17.23 3.21
South Africa 7.15 0.20 1.11 8.26 1.16 22.11 3.09
Source: Yu and others 2016.
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domestic producers would rather export their product and sell it 
at the higher world price.
Because of trade costs, the domestic price of tradable prod-
ucts is higher than the world price. Producers gain because they 
are able to sell at a higher price, with the markup correspond-
ing to the ad valorem trade cost. But they have to pay a higher 
price for the inputs used in production. That will be the case for 
imported inputs, but also — and this is a key assumption of the 
underlying model — for the domestically produced goods. If a 
downstream firm producing a final good for the domestic market 
is able to increase its prices in proportion to the nominal pro-
tection received because of trade costs, this is also the case for 
upstream firms producing intermediate inputs.
The net effect for a firm gives a higher rate of value added 
per unit of output than the free-trade benchmark when the addi-
tional cost of production is lower than the nominal protection 
received (or a lower rate of value added per unit of output when 
the additional cost of production is higher than the nominal pro-
tection received). Nominal protection in the domestic market 
for goods that are a firm’s inputs raises production costs and 
thus provides negative incentives to export. The service sector 
is always on the losing side (there is no nominal protection on 
its output, but it has to pay an additional cost for its tradable 
inputs). So are consumers. But because services are usually less 
tradable than goods, it is understood that service providers can 
pass on the additional costs to their customers.
Extended effective protection rates and the relative price of 
value added
The method used here to estimate the impact of trade costs 
across several countries and industries is adapted from the effec-
tive protection rate theory introduced by Balassa (1965) and 
Corden (1966). Their original formulation calculated effective 
protection rates by deducting the additional production cost 
that manufacturers had to pay because of the tariff charged on 
tradable inputs from the additional benefit generated by selling 
their product at a price higher than the free-trade market price, 
thanks to the duties charged on competitive imports. The result 
is the rate of value added at domestic prices (selling price minus 
cost of intermediate inputs required for the production) and is 
compared with the hypothetical value added that would have 
resulted from the operation if no custom duties had been levied. 
In table 4.3 the effective rate of protection is 25%, correspond-
ing to the additional gains (15) reported to the value added 
under free trade (60).
Effective rates can be calculated because of the availability 
of international input- output matrices, which are also used to 
measure trade in value added, as in the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD)–World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Trade in Value-Added database. As men-
tioned, the calculation also relies on the simplifying hypothesis 
of perfect competition and substitutability between imported 
and domestic products. Domestic industries are expected to 
raise their price in order to benefit from the additional costs due 
to tariff and freight costs applied to the imported goods that 
compete with their products. In that situation international trans-
action costs influence the domestic price of all inputs, whether 
imported or domestically produced. This ad valorem increase in 
the price of competing goods is the extended tariff and trans-
port nominal protection.
When all applied tariffs are most- favored- nation tariffs that 
do not discriminate between trading partners and when trans-
portation costs are proportional to the value of the imported 
good, the extended tariff and transport effective protection is 
the difference between the nominal tariff and transport pro-
tection enjoyed on the output minus the weighted average of 
tariff and transport paid directly (imported goods) or indirectly 
(domestic goods) on the inputs required for production. The 
weights applied to the additional tariff and transport costs on 
inputs are derived from the technical coefficients of the input-
output matrix.5 The extended tariff and transport effective pro-
tection rate is obtained by dividing this result by the value added 
that the industry would have enjoyed in the absence of tariff and 
transport costs. A formal presentation of the calculation is in 
annex 4.1.
Impact on competitiveness and export-led growth strategies
When the tariff and trade cost schedules are flat, the extended 
effective protection rate equals the nominal rate of tariff and 
transport protection. In table 4.3 that rate equals the rate of 
nominal protection (25%). But it will differ when there is vari-
ance in the tariff and nontariff trade costs, because some sec-
tors are more effectively protected than others. With tariff and 
transport cost escalation (most- favored- nation tariffs rising with 
the degree of processing or transportation and insurance costs 
increasing more than proportionally to the unit value of the 
goods), downstream domestic industries producing final goods 
TABLE 4.3 Influence of trade cost on value added and 
profit margin, domestic versus export prices
Profit and costs
Domestic 
market
Export  
market
No 
trade 
costs
With 
trade 
costs
No 
trade 
costs
With 
trade 
costs
Imported intermediate input 
(free on board) 40 40 40 40
Trade cost on inputs 0 10 0 10
Value added 60 75 60 50
Labor 40 40 40 40
Profit 20 35 20 10
Export price (free on board) .. .. 100 100
Domestic market price 100 125 .. ..
Source: Diakantoni and others 2017.
Note: Example is based on hypothetical values, for illustrative purposes only. 
The ad valorem trade cost (25%) is the same for input and output products.
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for the domestic market will benefit from a higher effective pro-
tection on their value added. By contrast, upstream industries 
producing unprocessed inputs and basic parts and components 
will have a low extended effective protection rate — and possibly 
a negative one if the sum of tariff and transport margins paid on 
inputs is higher than the margin of protection received on the 
output.
Therefore, downstream industries registering a high extended 
effective protection rate on their production will have little incen-
tive to export because the rate of return from exporting is lower 
than that from selling on the domestic market.6 Even upstream 
industries supporting a negative effective protection rate will 
still be better off selling on their domestic market, and the result 
holds for all domestic firms, but the anti-export bias is stronger 
for highly protected industries. This hurtful effect of escalation is 
particularly relevant for developing countries that want to diver-
sify their export basket away from basic commodities.
Trade frictions reduce the competitiveness of domestic firms 
in the most frequent situation where they are price takers and 
compete on the global market at international prices. When a 
domestic firm exports, it loses the additional benefit due to the 
nominal protection it receives on its output while still paying 
the additional cost on inputs purchased domestically. The only 
way to compensate for the additional costs and lower profits at 
export would be to reduce the value-added cost — for example, 
by paying lower wages or retaining less profit.7
This loss of cost competitiveness is particularly critical in a 
GVC context, when the customers on the export market are for-
eign lead firms that make their “make-or-buy” decisions as well 
as their choice of offshore localization on the basis of tight cost 
and profit margins. For this reason, policymakers have devel-
oped several strategies, from duty drawbacks (the exporter can 
redeem the value of the tariff duties and other indirect taxes 
paid on inputs used for exports) to free export processing zones 
(industrial parks installed in fiscal enclaves).
Such schemes (duty drawbacks and export processing zones) 
fall short of providing a first-best policy when the policymakers’ 
ultimate objective is to use GVCs as a path toward industrializa-
tion. Even if the typical arrangement in a supply chain contract is 
for the lead-firm or supply-chain manager to cover the interna-
tional costs of procurement, an exporting firm will still face the 
higher cost of purchasing its inputs domestically. So the high 
tariff and transport protection in place outside export process-
ing zones will limit the possibility of developing domestic interin-
dustry links (second-tier domestic suppliers), even if a domestic 
firm can join an international supply chain.8
Take the most favorable case of a first-tier supplier operating 
from an export processing zone in an international supply chain 
where the foreign lead firm covers the costs of transportation 
of the intermediate inputs and the re-export of the processed 
good. In that situation the first-tier supplier does not have to pay 
any transaction costs. Yet, even when duty drawbacks or tariff 
exemptions (as in export processing zones) correct for trade fric-
tions and allow domestic producers to purchase inputs at inter-
national prices, export-oriented firms still have a disincentive to 
purchase inputs internally because their second-tier domestic 
suppliers would not be able to benefit from the duty exemption.
Duty drawbacks and export processing zones compensate 
the exporting firm for the additional production costs caused by 
tariffs only when it uses imported inputs. Such a strategy effec-
tively prices out domestic suppliers when nominal tariffs and 
trade costs are high. Second-tier national suppliers of a domes-
tic exporting firm are usually not entitled to draw back the trade 
margins paid on their imports. Even if they were able to do so 
through some complex and arcane administrative mechanisms, 
they would still be at a disadvantage when using nonimported 
inputs (because nominal tariff and transport protection raises the 
domestic price of all tradable products, regardless of whether 
they are actually imported). The only possibilities for second-tier 
domestic suppliers to avoid tariff and transport costs would be 
to use only imported inputs or to exert downward price pres-
sure on their own domestic suppliers to recoup lost competi-
tiveness. While the anti-export bias is a well-known result from a 
traditional trade-in- final-goods perspective, the anti-upgrading 
corollary is new and relevant only from the vertical specialization 
perspective typical of GVCs, where a “buy” decision arising from 
a make-or-buy assessment implies arbitraging between domes-
tic and foreign suppliers.
Trade costs per sector and country
Diakantoni and others (2017) applied the extended effective 
protection rate methodology by crossing OECD-WTO Trade in 
Value- Added database data on 61 economies and the underlying 
OECD Inter-Country Input- Output Tables. The detailed tariff 
data for 2006 and 2011 were sourced from the WTO. Nontariff 
costs were taken from Duval, Saggu, and Utoktham (2015). These 
trade costs do not proceed from a direct calculation but are indi-
rectly derived from a gravity model applied to Trade in Value- 
Added database data: the trade frictions may result from a direct 
monetary cost (such as transportation, insurance, and other fees) 
as in the extended effective protection rate approach, but they 
may also arise from more subjective aspects, such as the ease or 
difficulty of gathering relevant information and other nonmone-
tary barriers (regulation, licensing), insecure contracts and weak-
ness in trade governance leading to uncertainty, differences in 
consumer taste, and so on. Nontariff trade measures are partic-
ularly relevant for GVCs because they may constrain the produc-
tion process itself (box 4.1). The monetary component, according 
to the experts who build the database, is believed to account 
for only one-third of these costs; this is the value retained in the 
extended effective protection rate application.
The first effect of tariff and nontariff trade costs is to pro-
tect domestic producers from competitive imported products 
by increasing the import price by a trade margin of 20% to the 
international price of competing imports (averaged across all 
sectors in 2011), 17% for nontariff costs and 3% for tariff costs, 
including 2.5% preference margin (table 4.4).9 Trade costs vary 
by a factor larger than four between the highest (food prod-
ucts) and the lowest (mining). Ranked by trade costs, the top 
five sectors are food products (35%), motor vehicles (27%), other 
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transport equipment (24%), agriculture (22%), and textiles (21%). 
The bottom five are computers (17%), other nonmetallic mineral 
products (17%), chemicals (17%), pulp, paper, and publishing 
(16%), and mining (8%). Commodities or primary goods such as 
mining, wood, or paper imported products face the lowest trade 
costs: tariffs are usually low, and the products are shipped in 
bulk, using sea freighters. At the other extreme, food products 
combine the disadvantages of being expensive to transport (as 
for perishable products) and being heavily protected by tariffs.
Considering that the protection received on output translates 
into an increase in the production cost for the users of those inter-
mediate products, the weight on competitiveness is substantial. 
Using the technical coefficient of the OECD Inter-Country Input- 
Output Tables as weights, Diakantoni and others (2017) found that 
the additional production cost due to tariffs on imported inputs 
was about 5.5%, after preferential treatments were included. 
Even so, the distribution of costs is skewed toward the higher 
range (7% and above). And this calculation takes into account 
only the direct cost of trade margins on imported inputs and not 
the indirect effect of also increasing the domestic market price of 
all products, regardless of whether they are imported.
Factoring in the impact of trade costs on the imported and 
domestic cost of inputs requires computing extended effective 
protection rates relative to a free-trade situation. This free-trade 
benchmark is not directly observable, but Diakantoni and others 
(2017) used German industries as the international benchmark 
because the German economy showed the lowest country/sector 
trade costs in their sample. Comparisons with this benchmark 
show that trade costs on inputs can greatly affect the compet-
itiveness of industries. The average non-German motor vehicle 
BOX 4.1
Tariff and nontariff measures
Among trade costs, nontariff measures have a specific role 
because they interfere with industrial norms, whose regu-
lation may also be considered trade enhancing. Nontar-
iff measures considered by the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) concern mostly regulations and standards, which are 
dealt with under sanitary and phytosanitary measures and 
the technical barriers to trade. Nontariff measures are not 
only normative; they also include such quantitative mea-
sures as safeguards, countervailing or antidumping mea-
sures, and other quantitative restrictions imposed against 
discriminative policy measures by trading partners.
With the lowering of tariff duties over the past decades, 
awareness is growing that nontariff measures are imposing 
new restrictions on trade, especially with the rising impor-
tance of global sourcing within global value chains (GVCs). 
Since the global financial crisis of 2008–09 the WTO primary 
monitoring and surveillance mechanism has been based on 
its periodic Trade Policy Reviews. Transparency mechanisms 
are also present in many regional trade agreements. Ing, 
Cadot, and Walz (2016) developed an index of nontariff mea-
sure transparency, based on WTO notification requirements. 
They show that transparency varies positively with income 
(except for non–Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development high-income countries). The index also 
varies across regions, high in the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and low in Africa and the Middle 
East. It may not be a coincidence that ASEAN is much better 
inserted in GVCs than the two other regions and that the 
top five countries are Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Germany, 
and Sweden, all economies with an important GVC sector.
In theory, tariffs are trade restrictions imposed to pro-
tect domestic producers, while nontariff measures are set 
to protect domestic consumers. Moreover, the use of inter-
national standards by either exporters or importers is likely 
to promote trade. The compliance of arm’s length suppliers 
with public and private norms (International Organization 
for Standardization standards on quality) substitutes for 
closer and more expensive lead-firm monitoring of the qual-
ity of traded intermediate inputs. By contrast, cumbersome 
and unharmonized nontariff measures increase trade costs, 
if only because they entail more complex customs proce-
dures. When not harmonized, nontariff measures are there-
fore expected to be trade-restrictive, especially for smaller 
firms or firms in less technologically advanced countries.
Discussions of the protectionist nature of nontariff mea-
sures are ongoing. Attempts to assess the trade impacts 
of nontariff measures have led to the development of 
“tariff equivalent” methods, which seek to estimate the 
ad valorem tariff that would have a trade-restricting effect 
equal to the nontariff measure in question (Ferrantino 2012). 
Adopting a specific GVC perspective, Ghodsi and Stehrer 
(2016) provided new ad valorem equivalents for nine types 
of nontariff measures, capturing the effects of these policy 
measures’ intensity across sectors, importers, and export-
ers. Interestingly, some providers (such as Canada) may 
actually benefit from what would be conceived as restrictive 
measures, while others (such as Bulgaria) incur larger losses. 
Less advanced countries may therefore be more affected by 
stringent nontariff measures. The effect is also differenti-
ated by industry and by type of nontariff measure: technical 
barriers to trade improve the cost efficiency of the inputs 
for the production of electrical and optical equipment, 
while sanitary and phytosanitary measures, tariffs, and aver-
age bilateral trade-restrictiveness indices increase the costs 
of inputs for these industries. Ghodsi and Stehrer (2016) 
concluded that regulated nontariff measures that enhance 
information symmetries reduce trade costs and increase 
market efficiencies.
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industry, a sector closely associated with GVCs, would register 
a gross margin 27% lower than the benchmark firm. Benefiting 
from drawbacks would reduce this loss, but the home industry 
would still lag behind the international competitor by a margin 
of about 20% if it continued sourcing other inputs domestically. 
Food industries also have little incentive to export: their value 
added would be 18% lower than the benchmark (14% with draw-
backs). When the industry relies heavily on imported inputs, as 
in the case of petroleum products, drawback schemes can yield 
an improvement of 10 percentage points.10 But this remains an 
exception; on average, drawbacks improve the competitiveness 
of domestic exporters by a margin of only 4–5 percentage points.
This loss of competitiveness varies by country according to 
trade costs (figure 4.1). The highest trade costs are in small devel-
oping economies (such as Cambodia and Costa Rica). Small devel-
oped countries can also face high costs when they are isolated 
from the main markets, as for small islands (Malta and Cyprus 
as well as New Zealand). Two factors may increase freight rates: 
the geographic distance between main trading partners and the 
small size of individual shipments. Except for China, the econo-
mies facing the lowest import costs are all developed economies.
Nominal tariff protection (as measured by most- favored- 
nation tariffs on industry output) declined between 2006 and 
2011 in a majority of the countries surveyed. Tunisia, the Republic 
TABLE 4.4 Incidence of trade costs on output and input prices, 2006–11
Sector
Nontariff Most- favored- nation tariff
Preferential  
tariff
Total including  
preferences
Outputs Inputsa Outputs Inputsa Outputs Inputsa Outputs Inputsa
2011 
(%)
Change, 
2006–11 
(percent-
age 
points)
2011 
(%)
Change, 
2006–11 
(percent-
age 
points)
2011 
(%)
Change, 
2006–11 
(percent-
age 
points)
2011 
(%)
Change, 
2006–11 
(percent-
age 
points)
2011 
(%)
Change, 
2006–11 
(percent-
age 
points)
2011 
(%)
Change, 
2006–11 
(percent-
age 
points)
2011 
(%)
Change, 
2006–11 
(percent-
age 
points)
2011 
(%)
Change, 
2006–11 
(percent-
age 
points)
001 Agriculture 16.1 0.4 2.9 0.1 11.7 –3.9 3.0 –0.7 5.6 –2.4 0.2 0.0 21.8 –2.0 3.1 0.0
002 Mining 7.3 0.1 2.2 0.0 0.6 –0.5 0.5 –0.1 0.8 –0.5 0.1 0.0 8.1 –0.4 2.3 0.0
003 Food 25.5 1.1 3.7 0.2 18.5 –2.2 6.3 –1.4 9.0 –3.7 0.5 –0.2 34.5 –2.6 4.2 0.1
004 Textiles 15.5 0.2 4.8 0.2 10.2 –1.5 2.9 –0.5 5.4 –1.9 0.5 –0.1 20.8 –1.7 5.3 0.1
005 Wood 18.2 0.2 3.0 0.1 4.3 –1.1 2.8 –0.7 2.5 –1.3 0.3 –0.1 20.7 –1.1 3.3 0.0
006 Pulp, paper 14.7 0.1 3.3 0.1 2.3 –1.0 1.3 –0.4 1.7 –0.8 0.2 –0.1 16.5 –0.7 3.5 –0.1
007 Coke, petroleum 19.0 0.2 7.0 0.2 2.8 –0.7 0.9 –0.3 1.3 –0.8 0.2 –0.1 20.3 –0.6 7.2 0.1
008 Chemicals 15.1 0.1 5.0 0.1 3.1 –0.6 1.6 –0.4 1.7 –0.7 0.3 –0.1 16.8 –0.6 5.3 0.0
009 Rubber, plastic 16.4 0.1 5.5 0.1 6.5 –1.3 2.1 –0.5 3.6 –1.5 0.4 –0.1 20.0 –1.3 5.8 0.0
010 Other mineral 
products 13.7 0.1 3.6 0.1 5.5 –0.1 1.4 –0.2 3.1 –1.2 0.2 –0.1 16.8 –1.0 3.8 0.0
011 Basic metals 16.9 0.0 6.1 0.1 2.3 –0.9 1.2 –0.4 1.5 –0.9 0.3 –0.1 18.4 –0.9 6.5 0.0
012 Metal products 15.2 0.0 5.0 0.1 4.8 –1.2 1.5 –0.5 3.0 –1.2 0.4 –0.2 18.2 –1.2 5.3 –0.1
013 Machinery not 
elsewhere classified 17.9 0.1 6.6 0.1 3.2 –0.6 1.7 –0.4 1.9 –0.7 0.4 –0.1 19.8 –0.5 7.0 0.0
014 Computer, 
electronic equipment 16.1 0.2 6.6 0.1 2.1 –0.4 1.3 –0.3 1.2 –0.6 0.4 –0.1 17.3 –0.4 7.0 0.0
015 Electrical 
machinery 17.9 0.2 6.6 0.2 4.3 –0.8 1.8 –0.4 2.6 –1.1 0.5 –0.2 20.5 –0.8 7.0 0.0
016 Motor vehicles 22.4 0.5 8.3 0.2 9.9 –2.0 3.1 –0.7 4.9 –1.9 0.7 –0.2 27.3 –1.4 9.0 0.0
017 Other transport 21.0 0.5 7.1 0.2 3.1 –0.3 1.8 –0.3 2.6 –1.1 0.4 –0.1 23.6 –0.5 7.6 0.0
018 Manufacturing not 
elsewhere classified 19.2 0.4 5.5 0.2 4.7 –1.3 1.8 –0.5 3.4 –1.2 0.4 –0.1 22.5 –0.8 5.9 0.1
Averageb 17.1 0.2 5.2 0.1 5.5 –1.1 2.1 –0.5 3.1 –1.3 0.4 –0.1 20.2 –1.0 5.5 0.0
Source: Yu and others 2016.
Note: Presents the main results obtained for 2011 and the changes observed since 2006, the initial and final year being imposed by data availability.
 a. Imported products only, using the 2011 technical coefficients of international input- output matrix as weights.
 b. Simple average across countries or sectors.
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of Korea, Argentina, Brazil, and India applied the highest nominal 
protection in 2011 — between 11% and 15% — and Hong Kong, 
China; China; Singapore; New Zealand; the United States; and 
Brunei Darussalam the lowest, between 0% and 2.5%.
The cost of tariffs is much lower than other transaction costs, 
estimated at an ad valorem tariff equivalent of 17%. Moreover, 
though tariffs have been decreasing, nontariff trade costs for 
inputs increased globally in 2011 over 2006, probably a result of 
increased uncertainty in the post-crisis era (Escaith and Miroudot 
2015).11 Trade frictions would translate into an average increase of 
17–32% of the production cost in a single stage of the value chain. 
Unless compensated for by savings on other aspects of produc-
tion (either unsustainable ones such as low remuneration for labor 
and investment or export subsidies) or by improving total factor 
productivity, those higher costs reduce the international compet-
itiveness of the industries in these countries. As the next sections 
show, reducing trade costs in one or several countries has impor-
tant positive spillover effects on other trading partners.
Extension and application to Canada and China
To lower trade costs and improve the competitiveness of man-
ufacturers, the Canadian government decided in 2010 to unilat-
erally eliminate tariffs on a broad range of manufacturing inputs 
and equipment. The elimination covered 1,541 tariff lines, most 
of them immediately (381 were gradually removed through 2015). 
Other trade costs were expected to be lowered, because customs 
procedures became simpler as importers would no longer need 
certify compliance with preferential rules of origin. The incidence 
of the measure is sizable: in 2010 intermediate goods accounted 
for 47.5% of Canada’s gross imports and capital goods for 18.9%. 
Obviously, the trade cost reduction will also benefit other coun-
tries by facilitating their access to the Canadian market.
Ciuriak and Xiao (2014) calculated that such benefits exceeded 
those from mutual tariff elimination under any of the major pref-
erential trade agreements that Canada had been pursuing. In 
comparing estimated gains from unilateral liberalization and 
preferential liberalization through trade agreements, they noted 
that not only did the gains from the unilateral route come with-
out the trade distortions associated with regional trade agree-
ments, but they were easier to realize since the question of rules 
of origin and the use of preferences did not enter the equation.
Focusing on tariffs, Yu and others (2016) used the Canadian 
example to study how partially or completely eliminating tariffs 
on imported intermediate inputs can help a country integrate into 
GVCs and enhance its trade competitiveness. They applied a com-
putable general equilibrium model to quantitatively analyze the 
impact of intermediate inputs tariff reduction on reducing multi-
stage production costs, promoting GVC-related trade activities, 
FIGURE 4.1 Ten countries with the highest and lowest trade cost in all sectors, 2011
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and accelerating the structural adjustment of China and the world 
economy under three policy scenarios. They looked at the impli-
cation for China of a similar initiative and explored three policy 
scenarios to analyze the impact of liberalizing intermediate goods 
trade on the global economy. The first scenario is China’s unilat-
eral elimination of tariffs on imported intermediate goods (the 
Canada scenario). The second covers a regional trade agreement 
between China and the Asian and East African countries included 
in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, reducing bilateral import tar-
iffs on intermediate goods trade to zero but maintaining tariffs for 
non–regional trade agreement countries. In the third scenario, all 
Group of 20 (G20) member countries completely eliminate tariffs 
on intermediate goods imported from all countries.
The first scenario — unilateral trade liberation of intermedi-
ate goods — would enhance China’s economic growth and trade 
with the rest of the world. Relative to the baseline, China’s real 
GDP would increase 1.2%, its exports would rise 5.7%, and its 
imports would rise 6.6%. China’s unilateral trade liberalization 
on intermediate goods imports would generate a small pos-
itive spillover effect, and the real GDP of the rest of the world 
would increase 0.01%, with exports expanding 0.17% and imports 
0.25%. The second scenario — bilateral tariff reduction on inter-
mediate goods trade between China and the Belt and Road 
region — would stimulate the economic growth and trade of sig-
natory countries. If bilateral tariffs on intermediate goods were 
exempted completely, real GDP would increase 0.43% for China 
and 0.42% for the Belt and Road region. China’s imports would 
rise 2.8%, and its exports would rise 3.2%, and trade in the Belt 
and Road region would grow 1.5%. GDP would increase 0.43% for 
China and 0.40% for the other signatories. However, the bilateral 
trade agreement creates trade diversion and leads to some neg-
ative economic effects on nonmember countries: their exports 
would decline 0.04%, and their imports would decline 0.03%.
If, as in the third scenario, G20 countries act jointly and unilat-
erally eliminate tariffs of intermediate goods imports, no diversion 
would take place, and the economic impact would be consider-
able. Real GDP would rise 1.35% for the European Union, 0.23% 
for the United States, 0.61% for Japan, 0.56% for other advanced 
G20 members (Canada and Australia), 1.87% for China, and 3.32% 
for other new emerging/developing G20 members. Exports would 
rise 3.1% for the European Union, 1.2% for the United States, 
4.3% for Japan, 1.9% for other advanced G20 members, 13.5% for 
China, and 8.6% for other new emerging/developing G20 mem-
bers, and imports would rise 2.3% for the European Union, 1% 
for the United States, 5.2% for Japan, 2.2% for other advanced 
G20 members, 13.4% for China, and 7.5% for other new emerging/
developing G20 members. According to the authors, trade liber-
alization would help exploit the comparative advantage of those 
countries and facilitate their economic upgrading. For example, 
the value added of tertiary industries and their GDP share in the 
United States, European Union, and other advanced G20 coun-
tries would rise substantially. The secondary industries in many 
developing G20 countries would also grow much faster. For exam-
ple, the value added of secondary industries in China would rise 
by $67 billion, and its GDP share by 0.35 percentage point.
The results illustrate the interdependency of national indus-
tries through trade in intermediate inputs and the importance 
of reducing trade costs in as many lead economies as possi-
ble. The next section looks at the systemic effect of trade costs 
and their spillover effects through close-knit interindustry trade 
interactions.
Cascading transaction costs in the world trade 
network
By measuring the impact of trade costs on the effective value 
added, the extended effective protection rate measures the 
magnification effect of tariff and transport costs on individual 
firms’ value added and competitiveness. This section turns to the 
entire international supply chain and examines trade costs as a 
cascading source of transborder cost-push transmission.
Accumulation of trade costs along international supply 
chains
GVC trade is characterized by multiple border crossings that 
generate double counting in traditional trade statistics because 
processing goods will cross several borders before reaching 
the final consumer. Correcting for this statistical bias was one of 
the initial objectives of measuring trade in value added. Double 
counting arises when goods in process cross successive borders. 
These successive border crossings open the door to potentially 
explosive embodied tariffs along GVCs.
For example, Yi (2003), Ma and Van Assche (2010), and Fer-
rantino (2012) highlighted the nonlinearity in the way transaction 
costs negatively affect trade flows in a trade in tasks perspec-
tive. Ferrantino (2012) showed that when trade costs apply in 
proportion to the value of a good, the total cost of delivering 
the product through the supply chain down to the final consumer 
increases exponentially with the number of production stages. 
For example, if the average ad valorem transaction cost is 10%, 
accumulated transaction costs in a five-stage supply chain lead 
to an ad valorem tariff equivalent of 34%. Doubling the number 
of stages by slicing up the supply chain more than doubles the 
total delivery costs, since the tariff equivalent is 75%.
Recent statistical advances on trade in value added and 
related trade costs allow accumulation to be measured with 
actual data. Rouzet and Miroudot (2013) formalized a measure of 
the cumulative tariffs embodied in trade in intermediates along 
international supply chains. Although nominal tariffs are low in 
most OECD economies, indirect tariffs can add a major burden 
by the time a good reaches its final user. For example, products 
imported from India into the European Union have paid a series 
of tariffs totaling 3.7%, 52% of which is directly levied at the EU 
border and 48% of which results from duties on intermediate 
inputs imported by India at previous production stages.
Building on the pioneering ideas of Wang and others (2016), 
who enhanced the analytical tools, Muradov (2016b) developed a 
similar analytical framework that decomposes sector value added 
or value of its final products along various value chain paths and 
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measures the length of each component.12 The decompositions of 
GVCs at the sector level reveal substantial variation in the length 
and importance of the relevant parts of the value chain. Using the 
international input- output matrices behind the OECD–WTO Trade 
in Value-Added database, Muradov (2016b) found that, overall, 
industries are moving downstream along the value chain in two-
thirds of the 34 sectors. As in Johnson and Noguera (2016), the 
results show that GVCs are also gaining importance over domestic 
value chains in both upstream and downstream directions.
Of special interest for this chapter, the GVC decompositions 
allow the trade costs accumulated along GVCs to be estimated. 
Muradov (2016a) found that the direct impact of tariffs (paid on 
imports) was almost always more significant than the accumu-
lated tariffs embodied in the cost of production of the products. 
The largest indirect tariffs were for Indonesia (3.76% direct, 1.33% 
indirect), Australia (2.44%, 1.30%), Chinese Taipei (2.52%, 1.28%), 
and Japan (1.39%, 1.28%). The indirect cost due to tariffs was 
higher than the direct one only in countries with low nominal pro-
tection: Luxembourg (0.18%, 1.02%), Malta (0.38%, 0.69%), the 
Russian Federation (0.73%, 1.27%), and Greece (0.72%, 0.92%).
In practice, the accumulation effect is lower than the simple 
exponential formula suggested — for several reasons. The first 
is the geography of supply chains. While the image of a chain 
implicitly projects a succession of sequential steps, most supply 
chains are not linear but are defined by a hub and spoke pattern. 
Figure 4.2 shows the topological differences between “spiders” 
and “snakes” types of GVC organization (Baldwin and Venables 
2010).
FIGURE 4.2 The global value chain zoo: spiders, snakes, and hybrid “snikers”
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Source: Diakantoni and others 2017, based on Baldwin and Venables 2010.
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In the spider first-tier suppliers of parts and components are 
arranged around a central assembly plant that ships the end 
product to its final destination. Unbundling costs are lower in the 
hub and spoke configuration: inputs cross a border at most twice, 
once as a part and once embodied in final output. In a snake 
each task is embodied in goods during processing, which are 
shipped again to the next production stage. At each stage the 
gross commercial value of the good in process increases, lead-
ing to cascading transaction costs. Diakantoni and others (2017) 
showed that the accumulated trade costs are greatly reduced in 
the spider. In real life, actual supply chains are “snikers” — hybrids 
of spiders and snakes.
The other important mitigating factor identified by Diakan-
toni and others (2017) is endogenous to the development of 
GVCs: supply chains can prosper and develop only when trade 
costs are low. And only when trade costs are below a certain 
threshold will a lead firm find it profitable to internationally out-
source part of the production.13 GVCs are Coasian constructs 
that exist only when the incremental benefit from improved 
complexity (GVC length) is higher than the increased transaction 
cost (box 4.2).
Not only is the total accumulated trade cost bounded by GVC 
efficiency, but for a given structure of efficiency gains the length 
of the GVC is negatively correlated with trade costs. As Yi (2003) 
showed, the relationship is not linear, and trade costs have to 
be greatly reduced before GVCs start expanding. It is therefore 
unrealistic to extrapolate accumulating trade costs along longer 
GVCs where ad valorem trade costs do not decrease. The net 
result between the decrease in ad valorem trade costs (the exog-
enous factor) and the resulting increase in GVC length may lead 
to relatively small increases in total accumulated costs ex post.
Consider a simple simulation exercise based on the hypoth-
esis that, for a given product, GVC expansion is endogenous to 
trade costs (figure 4.3). When trade costs are above a certain 
threshold, the length of the GVC measured in border crossings 
is 0: the places of production and consumption coincide, with-
out a border crossing. Only when trade costs fall beyond certain 
thresholds does it become profitable to shift part of the produc-
tion to another country that offers efficiency gains larger than 
the additional trade cost incurred. When trade costs are further 
reduced, new outsourcing opportunities may increase produc-
tion efficiency by enlarging the supply chain.
BOX 4.2
Transaction costs, trade, and foreign direct investment
Ronald Coase posited that corporations exist to economize 
on the transaction costs of markets. After they reach some 
size, organizational complexity becomes overwhelming, 
and the firm faces diseconomies of scale and scope. What 
Coasian economists call transaction costs include all imped-
iments to cooperation and encompass the trade costs dis-
cussed here. One aspect of this question, the “make-or-
buy” decision (vertical specialization), is central to the rise 
of GVCs and has been discussed from an international trade 
perspective by Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2003, 2005), 
who analyzed the determinants of international outsourcing 
as a function of trade and transaction costs. As firms adopt 
increasingly complex organization and sourcing strategies 
and as global value chains grow in length and layers, lower 
transaction costs become even more essential, especially 
when just-in-time management models make transport and 
communication a critical component of competitiveness.
Indeed, an increasingly important component of trans-
action cost, especially in GVCs, is information cost. Infor-
mation and communication technologies enable firms to 
better monitor assets and operation (Head and Ries 2008), 
communicate with foreign suppliers and customers (Old-
enski 2012), and substitute for the transfer of technology 
embodied in traded intermediates (Keller and Yeaple 2013). 
An emerging strand of research analyzes the role of com-
munication costs in determining the patterns of trade and 
multinational activity.
Similarly, firms engage in vertical foreign direct invest-
ment (when they fragment production or slice up the value 
chain because vertical foreign direct investment is motivated 
by comparative advantages, unlike older horizontal foreign 
direct investment, which is motivated by market access) 
because of cost considerations arising from countries’ 
factor cost differences (Alfaro and Chen 2017). Distance has 
become less an obstacle for foreign direct investment, as it 
did for trade. Using U.S. foreign direct investment outflow 
and inflow data for 2001 and 2010, they found that the share 
of U.S. outward foreign direct investment concentrated 
within 5,000 kilometers fell from around 30% to around 20%.
This change suggests an expansion of foreign direct 
investment flow across space in an era when transportation 
and communication costs have declined. The trend may also 
reveal that firms are less risk-averse when it comes to invest-
ing overseas because they perceive that global economic 
governance, in particular competition policy, has improved. 
A growing number of bilateral trade agreements have 
included chapters on competition policy that allow foreign 
affiliates to compete on more equal footing with domestic 
firms. As discussed in chapters 7 and 8 of this book, busi-
ness climate and contractual enforcement influence not only 
make-or-buy decisions, but also the choice between inter-
national outsourcing (arm’s length subcontracting) and off-
shoring through foreign direct investment when rules lack 
sufficient binding force for disciplining business practices.
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When GVCs are spiders, the marginal decrease in the ad 
valorem trade costs may compensate for the additional cost of 
further fragmenting the chain (at the third split). When GVCs 
are snakes, the decreasing ad valorem trade costs apply to an 
increasing accumulated value of trade in intermediate goods. In 
this case the mitigating effect of lower ad valorem trade costs is 
not as strong as for spiders because the trade costs accumulate 
exponentially (Ferrantino 2012). But the additional unit cost is 
decreasing, and the net effect becomes negative after a certain 
point (the seventh split).14 Established GVCs are also vulnerable 
to a reversal in the decreasing trend in ad valorem trade costs. 
If the ad valorem trade costs start increasing again, the GVC 
length is gradually shortened.
Cascading costs and trade facilitation: A world trade 
network perspective
Monetary costs are only one of the many facets of trade costs. 
The accumulation of trade frictions from beginning to end of pro-
duction networks goes against the raison d’être of GVCs, which 
require participants to operate in time-critical decentralized sys-
tems. To realize cost savings in production networks, intermedi-
ate products must be worked on and shipped between produc-
tion locations and onward into retail distribution systems (and 
then to the final consumer) as efficiently and quickly as possible.
Time lost waiting at borders (and related costs of storage and 
the like) are deadweight economic costs within the network. The 
time required to import depends on various elements, such as 
the efficiency of cargo handling at ports. The import process 
also takes longer when customs physically inspect cargo. Such 
delays in importing have large effects on firms’ activities. For 
one, the delays require importers to pay extra storage costs. 
Further, particularly when producers use imported inputs, delays 
require producers to reconsider initial production schedules, 
reducing their productivity. Djankov, Freund, and Pham (2010) 
found that each additional day a product was delayed by border 
formalities equated to adding 70 kilometers on average to the 
distance between trading partners. The effect was particularly 
pronounced for time-sensitive agricultural goods, where a day’s 
delay reduced a country’s relative exports by 6%.
Hayakawa, Laksanapanyakul, and Yoshima (2016) demonstrate 
that longer import time reduces export shipment frequency and 
exports per shipment — and thus total exports. A longer import 
time raises the marginal cost of production by lowering the pro-
duction efficiency and increasing the storage cost. This raises the 
marginal cost and lowers the firm’s total operating profit. Given 
that firms have to pay fixed costs for each export shipment, the 
total operating profit will not cover the total fixed costs unless 
the firm reduces the number of export shipments. As a result, 
firms that experience longer import times are more likely to 
reduce the number of export shipments.
In Thailand doubling the number of days to import would 
reduce total exports an estimated 3.3% and the number of 
export shipments an estimated 2.9%.15 Import time also has a 
major effect on import patterns. Increased import time reduces 
import shipment frequencies but raises imports per shipment. 
Specifically, doubling the number of days to import would 
reduce the number of import shipments an estimated 3.6% and 
increase imports per shipment an estimated 0.1%. As a result, 
total imports would be reduced. In sum, the time spent in one 
stage has effects on both upstream and downstream stages in 
international production networks.
In a competing GVC market this has clear implications for 
upgrading. In apparel value chains the most profitable seg-
ments are in the fashion industry, which is known to run on a 
high degree of uncertainty. With ever-changing trends it is even 
harder to predict the market and thus to forecast the required 
raw materials and supplies: only suppliers able to switch produc-
tion rapidly and adapt to fast turnovers are likely to be consid-
ered to supply this high value-added segment. Less flexible ones 
will remain confined to the high-volume–low-value segments, 
competing on low production costs.
More generally, it is largely accepted by analysts that all 
downstream final-good producers prefer timely delivery of 
(imported) intermediate inputs. Hummels and Schaur (2012) 
modelled exporters’ choices between fast-but-expensive air 
cargo and slow-but-cheap ocean cargo. Shorter delivery times of 
shipments lead to greater benefits because they allow importers 
to optimize production flows. If final-good producers can receive 
and use imported inputs exactly when they need those inputs, 
they are assumed to be able to transition smoothly into the pro-
duction processes, realizing greater production efficiency.
In a trade network this bilateral effect is compounded 
because the efficient organization of production flows between 
two trading partners also depends on the efficiency of upstream 
FIGURE 4.3 Ad valorem and accumulated trade costs in 
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and downstream GVC partners: the production chain will be as 
swift as its slowest link. Bilateral trade frictions should therefore 
be analyzed from a multiplayer perspective, including not only 
the other bilateral trading partners, as in conventional gravity 
models, but also indirect participants that are farther upstream 
or downstream in the supply chain. Improving the effectiveness 
in processing trade with a minimum of frictions will not have the 
same impact on the world trade network as improving logistic 
and trade facilitation in a country playing the role of a GVC hub.
Network and graph analysis applied to trade in intermediate 
inputs identifies key players by computing centrality indicators. If 
a trading partner (a node or a vertex, in network analysis) “influ-
ences just one other node, who subsequently influences many 
other nodes (who themselves influence still more others), then 
the first node in that chain is highly influential” (Borgatti 2005, 
p. 61). A player’s centrality is therefore a function of both its own 
importance in the world trade economy and the centrality of the 
trading partners it is associated with.
Trade in intermediate goods is organized along three large 
regional clusters — East Asia, centered on China; Europe, cen-
tered on Germany; and North America, centered on the United 
States — and dense extraregional exchanges (figure 4.4). The East 
Asia and Europe regional value chains include several smaller 
clusters organized around, for example, Japan and the United 
Kingdom.
To assess the contribution of each economy as a GVC trade 
facilitator, Diakantoni and others (2017) computed the PageRank 
centrality indicator, which is a more robust centrality indicator 
than alternative specifications, for each partner. They then com-
pared the PageRank indicator with various trade and transporta-
tion indicators, including the World Bank’s Logistics Performance 
Index, the most appropriate for the purpose (figure 4.5).
Trading partners are ranked according to their network cen-
trality and compared with their relative performance in timeli-
ness (as measured by a trade facilitation index). An ideal situation 
would be to have a perfect fit between GVC centrality and trade-
cost efficiency. When that is not the case, the analysis identi-
fies where trade facilitation investments would have the largest 
global impact. The hypothesis is that investments in upgrading 
trade-facilitation performance will have a large positive spillover 
and be highly profitable for global welfare when they improve 
the situation of a key player. A perfect fit between centrality and 
trade facilitation would show all countries aligned on the diago-
nal, which is far from the case. There is a large mismatch between 
the quality of trade and transport facilitation and the role of each 
economy in the world trade network.
The benefits of improving trade facilitation are usually mea-
sured using the traditional bilateral trade perspective, which is 
only part of the bigger GVC picture. The OECD has estimated 
the bilateral benefits of reducing trade costs from full implemen-
tation of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement at 16.5% of total 
costs for low-income countries, 17.4% for lower-middle-income 
countries, 14.6% for upper-middle-income countries, and 11.8% 
for OECD countries. Together, these estimates imply that a 1% 
reduction in trade costs has the potential to increase bilateral 
trade by 2.8–4.5% (WTO 2015; G20 TIWG 2016). While the direct 
benefits of trade facilitation will be proportionally higher for 
countries not well integrated into international trade because of 
their high trade costs, the global benefits will be higher if key 
traders at the core of GVCs undertake trade facilitation invest-
ments (see figure 4.5). Improving trade facilitation for econo-
mies below the line would benefit the entire trade community 
by reducing accumulated trade costs — the farther from the line, 
the higher the expected benefits. Six countries (among the 61 
in the Trade in Value-Added database) are particularly relevant 
from this perspective: Indonesia, the Russian Federation, Brazil, 
India, China, and Italy.
The network approach also suggests that the global benefits 
will be higher when trade facilitation investments go to the key 
GVC traders. As mentioned by Hayakawa, Laksanapanyakul, and 
Yoshimi (2016), trade costs often take the form of customs delays 
due to processing issues such as inconsistencies in Harmonized 
System codes between importers and customs, particularly when 
the correct applicable Harmonized System code is unclear for a 
product. Those issues can be solved without huge investment 
costs — for example, by implementing an advance ruling system 
that expedites the delivery of shipments because importers and 
other related parties can inquire about tariff classifications and 
duty rates prior to import.
Conclusions
The accumulation and magnification effects of cascading trade 
costs explain why complex GVCs cannot develop when those 
costs are above a certain threshold (Yi 2003). When the produc-
tion of a final good is fragmented across several countries, trade 
costs increase the purchase price of inputs, parts, and compo-
nents. The additional production cost increases the sale price and 
is transmitted to the next production step. Those costs accumu-
late in the supply chain through a cascading effect and are ulti-
mately embodied into the higher price paid by the final consumer.
Overall, trade frictions would translate into an average 
increase of 18% of the production cost in a single stage of the 
value chain. Most of the trade frictions result from transporta-
tion costs and deficient logistic and trade facilitation conditions: 
their incidence is estimated at an ad valorem tariff equivalent of 
17%. While some of these nontariff costs are outside the realm 
of national policymakers (as with geographic distance from the 
trading partner or sharing a common language), many fall under 
the control of domestic policy (logistics performance, cost of 
doing business, and so on).
Cascading trade costs not only penalize final consumers, they 
also erode the competitiveness of domestic industries on inter-
national markets and lower the effectiveness of export-led indus-
trialization strategies. Steep trade cost escalation creates a large 
anti-export bias on complex manufactured goods when value 
added is the traded commodity. This bias creates additional 
obstacles for export diversification and GVC upgrading. Besides 
tariff and transportation, nonmonetary costs, particularly delays 
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and uncertainty, are particularly relevant when the manufacture 
of merchandise is fragmented across several countries. Delays in 
a just-in-time business model disrupt the whole supply chain and 
render the entire process inoperable.
Trade costs vary by sector and country. Outside agriculture, 
the costliest sectors, as measured with the extended effective 
protection margin, are motor vehicles, transport equipment, 
petroleum products, computers, and machinery. Primary sectors 
FIGURE 4.4 Graphical representation of trade in intermediate goods, 2011
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carry the lowest trade costs because they require few inputs 
in the production chain. Small and low-income countries tend 
to suffer more from trade costs: Cambodia ranks as the most 
expensive country in additional trade costs.
The smaller domestic value added share in developing econ-
omies’ manufactured exports, compared with that in developed 
countries’ economies, tends to amplify the impact of trade costs 
through the magnification effect. From a trade and development 
perspective higher-than-average trade costs marginalize low-in-
come countries and prevent them from joining international 
supply chains. They may still compete by further reducing the 
wages paid to workers and the gross profit retained by the firm, 
but such a race to the bottom would severely limit their potential 
for industrial and social upgrading.
Many developing countries intend to lower their trade costs 
by setting up duty drawback schemes and export processing 
zones. But the effect is limited in time and scope, because they 
compensate exporting firms for the additional production costs 
only when they use imported inputs. Such strategies tend to 
price-out second-tier domestic firms. These mitigating policies 
are only second-best alternatives to fully fledged trade facilita-
tion when it comes to deepening domestic interindustrial links. 
Reducing tariff and nontariff trade costs globally through mul-
tilateral agreements is thus fully consistent with the interests 
of developing economies because it lowers their cost of GVC 
participation.
Finally, in a production network, bilateral trade costs tell only 
part of the story. In a close-knit network, competitiveness also 
depends on the costs faced by trading partners and by trade 
competitors. Poor trade facilitation among countries that rank 
highly in GVC trade (at or close to the heart of regional networks) 
impose a systemic cost both to themselves and to the rest of 
the trade community. The welfare benefits of the WTO Trade 
Facilitation Agreement from gains from trade will be enjoyed by 
the implementing economy, by its direct trading partners, and 
by the entire community. This magnified effect of trade facilita-
tion is directly attributable to the way trade costs accumulate in 
GVCs.
FIGURE 4.5 PageRank scores and Logistics Performance Index values, 2011
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ANNEX 4.1
Extended effective protection rates and 
the relative price of value added
Effective protection rates, in their original formulation, are calcu-
lated by deducting the additional production cost that manufac-
turers have to pay because of the tariff charged on tradable inputs 
from the additional benefit generated by selling their product at a 
price higher than the free-trade market price, thanks to the duties 
charged on competitive imports. The effective rate of protection 
(EEPR) on tradable good j is the difference between Vj, the value 
added obtained on the domestic market (with prices influenced by 
trade costs), and V*j, the value added that would be generated in 
the absence of policy and natural trade barriers, expressed as a pro-
portion of the frictionless value added. It is given by the expression:
EEPRj = (Vj – V*j) / V*j (A4.1.1)
Substituting products for industries, equation A4.1.1 can be 
expressed in standard input- output notation:
EEPRj = 
pj × tj – ∑i(ti × aij) – 1 (A4.1.2)
 pj – ∑iaij
where pj is the nominal price of output j at the frictionless trade 
price; aij are elements of the matrix A of technical coefficients in 
an input- output matrix at the frictionless trade price of inputs i;16 
tj is 1 + the rate of ad valorem tariff and transport nominal protec-
tion on sector j, where tj ≥ 1; and ti is 1 + the rate of ad valorem 
nominal tariff and transport protection on inputs purchased 
from sector i, where ti ≥ 1. i can be equal to j when a firm pur-
chases inputs from other firms in the same sector of activity. In 
an intercountry framework i also includes the partner dimension 
[c] because inputs from sector i might be domestic or imported.
In the trade literature this expression is often simplified into:
EEPRj = 
t’j – ∑i(t’i × aij) (A4.1.3)
 1 – ∑iaij
where t’i and t’j are the rates of ad valorem protection, where t’i > 0.
To analyze more precisely the impacts of trade costs on 
competitiveness as well as some mitigating measures that the 
exporting country could implement, it is important to distinguish 
between the costs of domestic (superscript h) and foreign inputs 
(superscript f ). Extended effective protection rates can be writ-
ten as:
EEPRj = 
tj – [∑i(ti × afij) + ∑i(ti × ahij)] – 1 (A4.1.4)
 1 – ∑iaij
where afij is the intermediate consumption i from the foreign 
country required to produce one unit of output j and ahij is the 
intermediate consumption i from the home country required to 
produce one unit of output j.
Even when duty drawbacks or tariff exemptions correct for 
trade frictions and allow domestic producers to purchase inputs 
at international prices (as in export processing zones), export- 
oriented firms still have a disincentive to purchase inputs inter-
nally from second-tier domestic suppliers, represented by the sum 
[∑i(ti × ahij)]. The first-tier domestic suppliers exporting their prod-
ucts to other participants in the international supply chain remain 
at a disadvantage to their free-trade competitors (right side of 
equation A4.1.5) when they source some of their inputs from 
other local suppliers or outsource some of their tasks to them:
(1 – [∑iafij + ∑i(ti × ahij)]) < (1 – ∑iaij) (A4.1.5)
In other words, export processing zones or drawbacks price-
out domestic suppliers when nominal tariffs and trade costs are 
high. To summarize the main implications of the formal model, 
even in the absence of tariff and transport cost escalation and a 
flat extended effective protection rate, trade frictions reduce the 
competitiveness of domestic firms, most frequently when they 
are price takers and compete on the global market at interna-
tional prices.
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ANNEX 4.2
Measuring the length of global value chains 
and the number of border crossings
The analysis of trade costs embodied in multistage international 
production processes is often carried out using international input- 
output models. The calculations have been made possible by the 
availability of the underlying input- output tables: Koopman and 
others (2010) estimate the cumulative effect of transportation and 
tariff margins using Global Trade Analysis Project Multi-Country 
Input- Output tables; Tamamura (2010) uses the Institute of Devel-
oping Economies–Japan External Trade Organization international 
tables to estimate the impact of regional trade agreements.
Length is most often estimated using the concept of average 
propagation length applied at the international level in Dietzen-
bacher and Romero (2007) for major European countries and by 
Inomata (2008) for Asia. The average propagation length rep-
resents the average number of production stages lining up in 
every branch of all the given supply chains. It is a shorthand rep-
resentation for an industry’s level of fragmentation, which relies 
on weighting the distance index by successive powers k of the 
technical coefficient matrix A. Aks are regarded as progressive 
impacts of the initial demand when supply chains are sliced at 
the kth stage of the production process. The average propaga-
tion length is defined as:
APLj–i = 1 × 
 aij + 2 ×
 [A2]ij + 3 × 
[A3]ij + … (A4.2.1)
 (lij – δij)  (lij – δij)  (lij – δij)
where lij is Leontief inverse coefficients [I – A]–1 and δij is a Kro-
necker delta product that is δij = 1 if i = j and δij = 0 otherwise.
In other words, the average propagation length is the 
weighted average of the number of production stages that an 
impact from industry j goes through until it ultimately reaches 
industry i, using the strength of an impact at each stage as a 
weight. By construction, the average propagation length shows 
a rapidly decaying effect after the second round, because of 
the low value of the nondiagonal coefficients in the Leontief 
matrix. As a result, the value of the additional element of the 
average propagation length suite falls rapidly to zero after the 
second production stage. That the Aks tend toward zero when k 
increases is actually a condition for the suite to converge to the 
Leontief inverse [I – A]–1, a result central to most GVC indicators. 
The smaller the value of extra-diagonal technical coefficients, the 
faster is the convergence to zero.
This is particularly true for the international coefficients (those 
outside the bloc-diagonal matrices representing the domestic 
interindustrial exchanges) and reflects the fact that most coun-
tries are largely self-sufficient in intermediate inputs. Therefore, 
the foreign component of Ak (coefficients outside the bloc-diag-
onal of domestic industries) is rapidly insignificant from an eco-
nomic perspective when k increases.17
The length of the GVCs can be factored in by using geo-
graphic distance or monetary transportation costs between two 
inter-related industries instead of counting production stages, as 
in the average propagation length formulation shown in equa-
tion A4.2.2. This calculation was suggested by Los and Temur-
shoev (2012). Once the distance between the supplying firm and 
its clients (dij) is known, a vector of input-weighted distance from 
customers to suppliers provides a geographical distance (dij is in 
kilometers) or an economic one (if dij is in monetary terms). The 
distance covered by the global value chain between its initiation 
and the final consumer is given by:
D: (I – A’)–1 D* (A4.2.2)
where D* is a diagonal input-weighted matrix of supplier-to- 
client distance by industry and country.18 Miroudot and Nord-
stöm (2015) adapt this methodology to measure the length of 
the external network of suppliers, sourcing the distance from the 
GeoDist database maintained by the Centre d’Études Prospec-
tives et d’Informations Internationales (Mayer and Zignago 2011).
Another way of looking at GVC length is to estimate the 
number of border crossings from the first step (most upstream 
sector/country) to final demand. Such a decomposition also 
allows an industry to be located in relation to its situation in the 
supply chain (upstream or downstream). Wang and others (2016) 
synthesize the various backward and forward measures by defin-
ing a GVC position index based on a thorough decomposition 
of the contribution of each production stage to the total value. 
Their index measures the distance from any production stage 
between the final demand and the initial factor inputs in a pro-
duction line by a combination of production links based on both 
forward and backward links. The length of the international part 
of supply chains (the one subject to cumulative tariff and trans-
portation costs) varies from country to country and sector to 
sector.
Muradov (2016a) proposes a new approach to quantify the 
accumulation of trade costs and the average number of back-
ward and forward border crossings. When the input- output coef-
ficients are calculated at basic prices (the most common situa-
tion), trade costs can be integrated into the A matrix by adding 
an additional row of trade margins. His method also relies on the 
use of an alternative to the Leontief matrix to compute a “global” 
inverse, disaggregating ex ante (instead of ex post, as in other 
approaches) the diagonal and off-diagonal blocs corresponding 
to, respectively, domestic and international transactions in the A 
matrix. Diakantoni and others (2017) discuss the interpretation of 
those trade margins when some of the trade costs are embodied 
in domestic inputs.
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Notes
1. Measuring the input use and value-added contributions along the 
production chain from beginning to end since the mid-1970s, the 
five stylized facts are the ratio of world value-added to gross exports 
(an indicator of GVC trade) has fallen over time, by roughly 10 per-
centage points; this ratio has fallen for manufacturing but has risen 
outside of manufacturing; changes have been heterogeneous across 
countries, with fast growing countries seeing larger declines in the 
ratio of their value-added to gross exports; declines in value added 
to export ratios have been larger for proximate partners that entered 
into regional trade agreements; and declines in value added to export 
ratios have been larger for country pairs that entered into regional 
trade agreements.
2. The author shows that in the presence of trade in intermediates GDP 
is not a good proxy for economic mass. As Noguera (2012) explains, 
deriving a gravity equation for bilateral value-added trade is com-
plicated by the nonlinear relationship between the value added and 
final-good demands. Trade costs affect trade in value added through 
their effect both on bilateral gross trade and on production sharing 
arrangements, but also through the trade costs corresponding to 
other pairs of countries in the supply chain.
3. In competitive markets GVC trade exists only when trade costs are 
lower than the efficiency gains of fragmenting the supply chain and 
outsourcing the tasks. So by definition accumulating trade costs have 
an upper limit. In a competitive market where all efficiency gains are 
translated to the price of the final product, any increase in trade costs 
will be paid by the consumer. In a semi-monopolistic market the effi-
ciency gains will accrue mainly to the lead firm.
4. The effective tariff rate on output differs from the effective rate of pro-
tection as it is usually understood in trade analysis and is used later in 
the chapter. It contemplates only the nominal protection on output 
but excludes the additional production cost on inputs.
5. Input coefficients aij are calculated by dividing input values of goods 
and services used in each industry by the industry’s corresponding 
total output. That is, aij = zij / Xj, where zij is a value of good/service i 
purchased for the production in industry j, and Xj is the total output 
of industry j. Thus, the coefficients represent the direct requirement of 
inputs for producing just one unit of output of industry j.
6. The exporting firm is considered to be a price taker that cannot 
impose higher prices and will have to compete on the global market at 
international prices. Incidentally, this result explains why small firms do 
not export as much as large firms in the more realistic situation where 
some of the trade costs are not ad valorem fees but are sunk costs.
7. This tactic may be used to gain a contract, but it is not sustainable 
in the long term if the firm wishes to retain skilled staff or invest and 
expand its production capacity.
8. The negative impact of high extended effective protection rates on 
second-tier domestic suppliers and the perspective of GVC upgrad-
ing in developing countries derives from the fact that tariff and 
transportation costs influence the domestic price of all inputs, includ-
ing domestically produced ones (goods, but also services).
9. The last year for which Trade in Value-Added database data were 
available is 2011, and 2006 is the first one where preferential tariffs 
were available for all trade partners on a comparable basis.
10. Even when the extended effective protection rate is negative, as in 
the mining sector, trade frictions still reduce the competitiveness of 
domestic firms when they compete on the global market at interna-
tional prices while still paying domestic prices for their inputs.
11. The nontariff trade costs from Duval, Saggu, and Utoktham (2015) 
include factors other than freight and insurance costs.
12. The paper is also of interest since it surveys the state of the art and 
brings together the results of alternative decompositions. The pre-
sentation of these decomposition techniques, which rely on the inter-
national input- output matrix and its mathematical properties, would 
require complex calculus. For example, the decomposition of the 
number of transactions along the downstream value chain in Muradov 
(2016b) results in as much as twelve indicators (see annex 4.2 for an 
introduction).
13. In practice, the lead firm may have strategic objectives in international 
outsourcing that go beyond pure cost-efficiency, but this chapter 
focuses only on value added and production costs.
14. Intuitively, the existence of an inflection point can be explained as fol-
lows: when trade costs are very high, accumulated cost is 0 because 
no trade takes place; when trade is frictionless, accumulated trade 
costs are also 0 because there are no trade costs. So, between these 
two extreme positions, accumulated trade costs should increase with 
the length of the GVC up to a maximum, then decrease afterward.
15. The authors use transaction-level export and import data from 2007 
to 2011 that cover all commodity exports and imports in Thailand.
16. Input coefficients aij are calculated by dividing input values of goods 
and services used in each industry by the industry’s corresponding 
total output. That is, aij = zij / Xj, where zij is a value of good/service i 
purchased for the production in industry j, and Xj is the total output 
of industry j. Thus, the coefficients represent the direct requirement of 
inputs for producing just one unit of output of industry j.
17. This is true for the industry average, represented in an input- output 
matrix. This average is prone to aggregation bias, and export-ori-
ented industries may be much more reliant on imported inputs than 
the average domestic firm. This can be observed in the Trade in 
Value- Added database, which distinguishes several types of firms in 
China and Mexico.
18. For each domestic industrial sector, an average distance to interna-
tional supplier is calculated, weighting the distance to the suppli-
er’s country by its share in the total inputs imported by the domes-
tic industry. From a purely international trade perspective, domestic 
interindustry commerce should be set to 0 (the distance between two 
domestic firms is nil), but this is an oversimplification for some devel-
oping countries, where most people live in coastal areas and inland 
transportation is more expensive than international freight.
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